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Forecasting the Future Reimbursement System of Korean 
National Health Insurance: A Contemplation Focusing on Global 
Budget and Neo-KDRG-Based Payment Systems
With the adoption of national health insurance in 1977, Korea has been utilizing fee-for-
service payment with contract-based healthcare reimbursement system in 2000. Under the 
system, fee-for-service reimbursement has been accused of augmenting national 
healthcare expenditure by excessively increasing service volume. The researcher examined 
in this paper two major alternatives including diagnosis related group-based payment and 
global budget to contemplate the future of reimbursement system of Korean national 
health insurance. Various literature and preceding studies on pilot project and actual 
implementation of Neo-KDRG were reviewed. As a result, DRG-based payment was 
effective for healthcare cost control but low in administrative efficiency. Global budget 
may be adequate for cost control and improving the quality of healthcare and 
administrative efficiency. However, many healthcare providers disagree that excess care 
arising from fee-for-service payment alone has led to financial deterioration of national 
health insurance and healthcare institutions should take responsibility with global budget 
payment as an appropriate solution. Dissimilar payment systems may be applied to 
different types of institutions to reflect their unique attributes, and this process can be 
achieved step-by-step. Developing public sphere among the stakeholders and striving for 
consensus shall be kept as collateral to attain the desirable reimbursement system in the 
future.
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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
INTRODUCTION
In conjunction with the adoption of national health insurance 
in 1977, Korea has been utilizing fee-for-service reimbursement 
system where providers receive payment for each service ren-
dered. Since 1995, the cost of insured medical care for health-
care institutions has risen by 29% on average each year (1). When 
this figure is supplemented by the cost for pharmacies, the total 
cost of insured medical care is observed to increase by 40.5% 
each year (1) as summarized in Table 1.
  However, the latter shall take into account the effect of ‘sepa-
ration of prescribing and dispensing drugs’ implemented be-
tween 2000 and 2001. The annual trend of cost of insured medi-
cal care for both healthcare institutions and pharmacies as well 
as the effect of separation of prescribing and dispensing drugs 
are comprehensively illustrated in Fig. 1.
  Health insurance law in Korea was revised to national health 
insurance law in 2000 with an introduction of contract-based 
healthcare reimbursement system. Prior to 2000, the reimburse-
ment methods in Korea went through a series of changes from 
voluntary reimbursement system and reimbursement permis-
sion system to government-fixed reimbursement system (2). 
First, voluntary reimbursement system was in effect from the 
period of Japanese colonial rule to 1951 in which healthcare re-
imbursement was voluntarily determined by healthcare institu-
tions. During this period, the healthcare market retained monop-
olistic structure, and thus reimbursement was relatively very 
high when compared to general price level. Second, reimburse-
ment permission system was in effect from 1951 to 1976 where 
monopolistic provider voluntarily determined the reimburse-
ment level in the healthcare market. Third, government-fixed 
reimbursement system was in effect from 1977 to 1999. As not-
ed earlier, health insurance law was revised to national health 
insurance law in 2000 and the reimbursement system changed 
from the existing government-fixed system to a contract-based 
system. This transition of reimbursement systems is shown in 
Fig. 2.
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relative value scale was newly adopted. Under the relative value 
scale system, reimbursement for each service rendered is deter-
mined by multiplying relative value (i.e. value score) by conver-
sion factor (i.e. price per value score). Beginning in 2007, rela-
tive values have been established by National Health Insurance 
Corporation (NHIC) with conversion factors determined through 
negotiations among NHIC, Ministry of Health & Welfare, and 
individual provider associations (3) as shown in Fig. 3.
  If these associations successfully established reimbursement 
contract with NHIC, the level and rate of reimbursement for that 
particular year would be finalized as agreed upon. Otherwise, 
they would be put on vote. Since the value scores of specific ser-
vices provided are fixed, only the conversion factors may be sub-
ject to change year by year, and Table 2 below shows the transi-
tion of conversion factors from 2001 to 2010.
  Contract-based reimbursement system in Korea, however, 
has indicated constraints and raised disputes among different 
provider groups to date mainly due to the origin of supporting 
data for analysis (3). A variety of mechanisms have been sug-
gested to deduce appropriate conversion factors and reimburse-
ment rates, but the majority of the analysis methods rely on finan-
cial statements voluntarily submitted by corresponding provid-
er institutions including hospitals and clinics. Consequently, 
stakeholders involved in reimbursement contract ended up 
questioning the transparency and accuracy of the specific rates 
suggested by the opposite party, thus often leading to a rupture 
of negotiations.
  Therefore, the researcher in this study pays close attention to 
the effect of fee-for-service reimbursement on national health 
insurance in Korea. As discussed above, the increase in the health-
care reimbursement rate has caused the cost of insured medi-
cal care to rise to a significant degree. Furthermore, fee-for-ser-
Table 1. Annual trend of cost of insured medical care for healthcare institutions and pharmacies                                                                               <Amount in KRW billion>
Year ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02
Pharmacy    166    200    226    259    320   1,190   4,606   5,024
Healthcare institution 5,999 7,440 8,500 9,712 11,201 11,721 13,263 13,806
Total cost of insured medical care 6,166 7,641 8,727 9,972 11,521 12,912 17,869 18,830
Year ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10
Pharmacy   5,475   6,195   7,022   8,035   8,892   9,543 10,697 11,485
Healthcare institution 15,266 16,310 17,838 20,374 23,496 25,325 28,641 32,142
Total cost of insured medical care 20,741 22,505 24,860 28,409 32,388 34,868 39,338 43,627
Source: National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC), Statistical Yearbook.
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vice reimbursement in Korea has been accused by a variety of 
stakeholders of augmenting national healthcare expenditure by 
excessively increasing healthcare service volume. With this tak-
en into account, the researcher examines in this paper the two 
major alternatives, which are ‘diagnosis related group (DRG)-
based payment system’ and ‘global budget system’ , and fore-
casts the future of reimbursement system of Korean national 
health insurance.
BACKGROUND
In order to alleviate the aforementioned issues posed by fee-for-
service reimbursement, a number of reimbursement alterna-
tives have been given careful consideration by the decision-mak-
ers in Korea. Among a number of alternatives available, DRG-
based payment and global budget systems have most frequent-
ly been discussed in Korea to date.
Diagnosis related group (DRG)-based payment system
The Healthcare Reform Commission under the Ministry of 
Health & Welfare proposed to phase in the DRG-based payment 
system in Korea in 1994 in order to overcome the existing limita-
tions of fee-for-service payment (4). DRG-based payment sys-
tem is a form of case-based prospective payment system (PPS) 
under which payment is based on particular diagnoses deter-
mined by physicians. Each DRG categorizes patients who share 
uniform clinical profiles and requisite resources. In the US, ap-
proximately 990 categories of DRGs (modified in 2010) are ap-
plied to hospital inpatient services (5). Major European coun-
tries are reported to prevent hospitals from evading patients 
with severe conditions and promote efficient usage of resourc-
es by utilizing inpatient DRGs when allocating budget to hospi-
tals through global budget system. In case of Korea, Hospital 
Research Institute at Seoul National University initially devel-
oped a Korean version of DRGs, namely KDRG, to improve the 
overall review process of health insurance claims (6). Subse-
quently, the KDRG was refined in 1991 based on the refined 
DRG of the US, which considered the severity of diseases and 
conditions, and was applied to a specified group of diseases on 
a trial basis.
  Under the case-based payment system, gross medical fee is 
determined by ‘Rate(s) per case X Total number of cases’ where 
the providers can only increase the number of cases, and thus 
the cost of medical care is likely to decrease. In fact, MEDPAC 
reported in 2002 a 32.2% decrease in the average length of stay 
(LOS) of hospitals between 1989 and 1999 (7). Meanwhile, Ger-
many adopted Australian DRG in 2004 and experienced a neg-
ative growth of national healthcare expenditure in the years to 
follow (5). Therefore, case-based payment system such as DRGs 
may be seen as a valid cost cutting mechanism which has the 
ability to eliminate the factors of excessive care commonly ob-
served under the fee-for-service payment system.
  With regard to the quality of healthcare, no cases have been 
reported that the application of DRGs degraded the quality of 
care provided in the US (8, 9). In addition, case-based payment 
system is very convenient in terms of administration, and DRG-
based payment system prevents the providers from charging 
excessively when compared to fee-for-service payment system. 
However, the preventive measure under the DRG-based payment 
system requires a substantial amount of screening and moni-
toring. As Charles and Weber noted, it is difficult to conclude 
that the DRG-based system is simply better than the fee-for-
Table 2. Transition of conversion factors in Korea 2001-2010
Year ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10
Conversion factor (KRW) 55.4 53.8 55.4 56.9 58.6 60.7 62.1 62.1* 63.4* 65.3*
Delta (%) -  -2.9   3.0   2.7   3.0   3.5   2.3 No change*   2.1*   3.0*
*Denotes final reimbursement for clinic-level healthcare organizations.
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rate
Relative value 
(Score per service provided)
Conversion Factor 
(Price per score)
National Health Insurance Corporation
↓
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provider associations 
↓
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↓
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↓
Health Insurance Review & 
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service system as far as administrative costs are concerned (10).
Global budget system
The recent financial deterioration of Korean national health in-
surance after the integration of national health insurance and 
separation of prescribing and dispensing drugs has demanded 
a change of reimbursement system from fee-for-service pay-
ment to global budget. Global budget is used by many Europe-
an countries showing a stable increase rate of healthcare expen-
diture except Portugal. Among the Asian countries, Taiwan is 
identified to apply global budget to all of the healthcare institu-
tions. In Taiwan, the budget increased by 3.5% in 2009 compared 
to that of the previous year. Furthermore, Taiwan simultane-
ously applies the soft-cap floating point value which is similar 
to the sustainable growth rate (SGR) used in the US (11).
  A good example of global budget application is the method 
used in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, budget for negoti-
ation is determined by the following equation (11), in which 
capital expenditure is subject to repayment in 50 yr and is reim-
bursed on a daily basis.
  Budget for negotiation for hospitals
=  (No. of regional patients X Tariff) + (No. of approved beds 
X Tariff) + (No. of approved specialist unit X Tariff) + (No. of 
cases of hospital inpatients X Tariff) + (Total LOS X Tariff) + 
(No. of cases of hospital outpatients X Tariff) + (No. of special 
treatments X Tariff) + (No. of cases of day surgery X Tariff)
  Since budget negotiation is a relatively simple method, admin-
istrative cost of global budget can be significantly reduced com-
pared to that of fee-for-service payment. However, the providers 
may substitute by low-cost services, thus leading to a possible 
degradation of the quality of services provided. In case where 
variable budget system is used for quality control as witnessed 
in the Netherlands, the cost of medical care may increase again.
KDRG-BASED PAYMENT SYSTEM IN KOREA
As discussed earlier in this paper, the Healthcare Reform Com-
mission under the Ministry of Health & Welfare proposed to 
phase in the DRG-based payment system in Korea in 1994 in 
order to overcome the existing limitations of fee-for-service pay-
ment. Accepting the proposition, the government carried out       
a KDRG (DRG, hereafter)-based system pilot project for eight 
groups of surgical diseases and procedures (appendectomy, 
tonsillotomy, hernia, cesarian section, hysterectomy, eutocia, 
cataract, and hemorrhoid) from February 1997 to 2001 (12). The 
results of the pilot project can be examined in three domains 
including cost, health services, and quality. Here, health servic-
es domain can further be broken down into three sub-domains 
of changes in service volume and LOS, provision of specified 
tests and treatments, and transition to outpatient services. In 
this part of the study, the researcher reviewed these results of 
the pilot project reported by the Health Insurance Review & As-
sessment Service (13).
COST DOMAIN
The first set of results from the DRG-based system pilot project 
focused on the cost effect of the system. First, a total of 318 fe-
males among the 99 females in 1997, 119 in 1998, and 100 in 
1999 who were discharged from a general hospital after receiv-
ing cesarian section were selected to examine the changes in the 
amount of self-payment (out-of-pocket) as well as of the insurer’s 
payment (13). As a result, the actual amount self-paid by the pa-
tients dropped each year to KRW 228,800 in 1997, KRW 188,200 
in 1998, and KRW 191,300 in 1999. On the contrary, the amount 
paid by the insurers increased from KRW 537,200 to KRW 810,100 
in 1998 and KRW 831,200 in the following year. These results 
were all statistically significant with P < 0.001. Second, 100 fe-
males in 1999 and the same number of females in 2000 who re-
ceived cesarian section at a general hospital in 1997 were cho-
sen (13). The amount of self-payment before the pilot project 
was KRW 345,825 in 1997 with the amount after the pilot proj-
ect in KRW 170,305 in 1999 and 2000, thus showing a substan-
tial decrease after the project was carried out. This might have 
been caused by the change in reimbursement structure after 
the pilot project that excluded voluntary uninsured elements. In 
addition, the amount of insurers’ payment before the pilot proj-
ect was KRW 721,066 in 1997 with the amount after the pilot proj-
ect in KRW 677,843 in 1999 and 2000, thus showing a decrease 
after the project was carried out with statistical significance (P <  
0.01). According to these results, the implementation of the DRG-
based system pilot project had a rather inconsistent impact on 
payment accuracy, insurer’s payment, and patient’s self-pay-
ment. Depending on the specific groups of diseases or health 
services provided, the total amount of health expenditure, in-
surer’s payment, and patient’s self-payment increased in some 
cases while decreasing in others.
HEALTH SERVICES DOMAIN 1
The second set of results from the pilot project focuses on the 
health services domain of DRG adoption in Korea. In specific, 
this domain examines the changes in service volume and LOS. 
A total of 318 females among the 99 females in 1997, 119 in 1998, 
and 100 in 1999 who were discharged from a general hospital 
after receiving cesarian section were selected again to analyze 
the changes both in health service volume and LOS before and 
after the pilot project took place by calculating average costs and 
LOS of inpatient examinations, injections, and oral medications 
affected by physician’s diagnosis (13). As a result, service volume Kim Y-K  •  Reimbursement System of Korean National Health Insurance 
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decreased by 25% in the first year and 29% in the second year 
after the pilot project was carried out. The LOS also decreased 
by 1% in the first year and 6% in the second year after the proj-
ect took place. According to Lee et al. (14), the average LOS of 
monocular crystalline lens surgery decreased by 1.6 days (32.6%) 
from 4.9 days to 3.3 days, while that of binocular crystalline lens 
surgery decreased by 1.8 days (23.5%) from 7.6 days to 5.8 days. 
Furthermore, the cost, affected by service volume change, of 
monocular crystalline lens surgery dropped by KRW 174,344 
from KRW 1,218,233 to KRW 1,043,889, while that of binocular 
crystalline lens surgery decreased by KRW 229,801 from KRW 
2,303,907 to KRW 2,074,106. Therefore, significant differences 
were observed before and after the pilot project. Second, 100 
females in 1999 and the same number of females in 2000 who 
received cesarian section at a general hospital in 1997 were cho-
sen again, and the average LOS decreased from 7.6 days in 1997 
to 6.7 days in 1999 and 2000 with statistical significance (P < 0.01) 
(13). In conclusion, the implementation of the DRG-based sys-
tem pilot project had a positive effect on the health services do-
main 1 that both of the service volume and LOS decreased fol-
lowing the implementation.
HEALTH SERVICES DOMAIN 2
The third set of results from the pilot project focuses on the health 
services domain of DRG adoption in Korea. In specific, this do-
main explores provision of specified tests and treatments. Among 
the 318 females who were discharged from a general hospital 
after receiving cesarian section from 1997 to 1999, intravenous 
injection decreased by 5% in the first year and 11% in the sec-
ond year after the pilot project (13). On the contrary, the period 
of oral antibiotics application increased by 8% in the first year 
and 10% in the second year after the project. Service volume of 
intravenous injection decreased while that of oral antibiotics 
increased. Lee et al. (14) reported that the days of use of antibi-
otics injection decreased by 36.5% for monocular crystalline 
lens surgery while it decreased by 19.4% for binocular crystal-
line lens surgery. Among the 200 females chosen in 1999 and 
2000 who received cesarian section at a general hospital in 1997, 
the average drug price of oral antibiotics before the project was 
KRW 37,044, and the price dropped to KRW 20,294 after the proj-
ect (13). In all specialty areas, the amount of antibiotics used 
per one inpatient decreased. These results imply that the DRG-
based system pilot project retained weak control over the provi-
sion behavior of certain tests and treatments.
HEALTH SERVICES DOMAIN 3
The fourth set of results from the pilot project focuses on the 
health services domain of DRG adoption in Korea. In specific, 
this domain examines transition to outpatient services. Lee et 
al. (14) reported that number of outpatient visit prior to hospi-
talization is decreased while the total medical fee and fee per 
visit are increased for monocular crystalline lens surgery. Fur-
thermore, number of outpatient visits, total medical fee, and fee 
per visit all decreased after hospital discharge. In case of binoc-
ular crystalline lens surgery, number of outpatient visits, total 
medical fee, and fee per visit all increased prior to hospitaliza-
tion. Number of outpatient visits and total medical fee decreased 
and fee per visit increased after hospital discharge. Among the 
200 females chosen in 1999 and 2000 who received cesarian 
section at a general hospital in 1997, the average number of 
outpatient visits was 1.3 in 1997 and 1.1 in 1999 and 2000 show-
ing a slight decrease after the pilot project (13). This result con-
flicted with the evaluation conducted by Jung and Lee (15) that 
reported a 6.9% increase for the same variable. In conclusion, 
the DRG-based system pilot project retained a variable effect 
on the frequency of patient visits to outpatient services prior to 
and discharge from inpatient services.
QUALITY DOMAIN
The last set of results from the pilot project focuses on the changes 
in quality upon DRG adoption. Yim et al. (16) evaluated the ef-
fect of DRG system on the quality of healthcare by comparing 
122 individuals who received surgical procedures under fee-for-
service and 258 individuals who received similar services under 
DRG across 40 different healthcare institutions. As a result, no 
significant difference was observed between the conduct rates 
of required tests before and after surgery, and the groups under 
DRG system were shown to have higher quality of healthcare 
(P < 0.05). The LOS of healthcare institutions with a longer pe-
riod (one to two years) of DRG application was shorter than that 
of the institutions with a short history of application (13). Lee et 
al. (14) reported no significant difference in the incidence rate 
of complications within one month after surgery. In conclusion, 
these results implied that the DRG-based payment system does 
not significantly degrade the quality of healthcare, and the groups 
of diseases under the DRG-based system may reflect higher qual-
ity of healthcare than the groups without any DRG application.
ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION
Upon the results obtained from the DRG-based system pilot 
project, healthcare institutions were given the option to choose 
either the fee-for-service payment system or DRG-based PPS 
for four specialty areas and eight groups of diseases and condi-
tions from January 2002. By 2007, more than 2,350 institutions 
participated in the actual implementation. However, the major-
ity of these institutions was clinic-level institutions, and advanced 
tertiary institutions, which require actual application of the sys-
tem, did not participate or withdrew from the program leading Kim Y-K  •  Reimbursement System of Korean National Health Insurance 
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to the failure of DRG-based payment system overall. In particu-
lar, the healthcare sector already was pessimistic toward the 
DRG system since its implementation, and this behavior has 
been basically identical to date. The healthcare sector in Korea 
has been opposing the adoption of DRG-based system for the 
following principle reasons.
1) The adoption of the DRG-based payment system has not 
reflected the opinions of the healthcare sector, the rele-
vant party, and introducing a foreign program developed 
in a dissimilar environment is likely to cause side effects.
2) Just as the fee-for-service system caused a rise in the gross 
healthcare expenditure in Korea by distorting care pat-
terns where reimbursement is significantly low, the DRG-
based payment system is also likely to bring about its own 
problems. The potential problem in the case of DRG would 
be ‘under-care’.
3) Degradation of the quality of healthcare and restraints on 
the development of innovative medical technology or 
materials are anticipated under DRG.
NEO-KDRG-BASED PAYMENT SYSTEM IN KOREA
As discussed earlier, the Korean government phased in the adop-
tion of DRG-based payment system starting with a pilot project 
in 1997 eventually leading to the actual implantation of the pro-
gram in 2002. However, while lacking a social consensus, the 
existing DRG model was limited only to certain groups of dis-
eases and conditions and applying the system for the healthcare 
institutions remained purely ‘optional’. This model was a case-
based model with low flexibility focusing on relatively simple 
diseases, and thus could not be applied to other diseases with 
great deviations in the care provided. Particularly, the existing 
model could not ensure the quality of healthcare provided to 
patients with high severity and complexity that a new mecha-
nism became necessary. In response to these issues, the gov-
ernment recently developed the ‘Neo-KDRG (hereafter DRG)-
based payment system’.
Neo-DRG-based payment model
Neo-DRG-based payment model has been developed as an   
effective alternative to alleviate the limitations of the existing 
fee-for-service system and DRG model in Korea. The model 
was designed initially for 20 groups of diseases and conditions, 
and the government carried out a Neo-DRG-based payment 
pilot project by applying the model to Ilsan Hospital which is 
an insurer hospital from April 2009 (15). The specific diseases 
included in the Neo-DRG payment model are shown in Table 3.
Evaluation on Neo-DRG pilot project
Under PPS, the providers strive to reduce resource consump-
tion since the level of reimbursement for the services provided 
is fixed in advance. This facilitates controlling healthcare expen-
diture but it may lead to ‘under-care’ at the same time. Under 
any payment system, reimbursement for resource utilization 
becomes asymmetric if bundling of payment unit becomes too 
big while the limitations related with fee-for-service arise if it 
becomes too small. Neo-DRG-based payment system is indeed 
a mixture of PPS and fee-for-service which shows a significant 
difference compared to the existing DRG model and fee-for-
service system. The issue is, then, how and to what extent we 
are going to differentiate and use the two systems simultane-
ously.
  The recent Neo-DRG model enables us only to identify the 
accuracy of healthcare reimbursement and changes in self pay-
ment and insurers’ payment, but it cannot support analyzing 
the specific behaviors behind health service provision or transi-
tion from the bundling domain to the per-service domain. The 
medical staff at Ilsan Hospital may have less resistance toward 
Neo-DRG model itself than those at other institutions; however, 
Ilsan Hospital is a public insurer hospital which makes identify-
ing the changes in general care behavior very difficult. Given the 
current conditions, we can re-evaluate the model on the follow-
ing criteria.
1) Is the level of reimbursement set as appropriate?
2) Is the provider behavior induced to appropriate direction?
3) Is the model technically well-designed?
  The Korean government is currently planning on developing 
yet another new model which will be applied to more than 70% 
of the entire population of inpatients through expanding the 
applicable groups of diseases and conditions. Furthermore, 
these disease groups will be used in four public regional-hospi-
tals then in 40 additional public regional-hospitals following 
Table 3. Diseases & conditions included in the Neo-DRG pilot project
Classification Disease code Title
Medical B6623
E6131
G6711
H6030
K6000
L6022
L6311
U6101
U6301
Non-bleeding stroke, age > 69
Bacterial pneumonia, age 0-17
Gastroenteritis, age 0-17
Cirrhosis & alcoholic hepatitis w/o complications
Diabetes
Terminal kidney disorder, age > 64
Infection of kidney and urinary tract, age 0-64
Schizophrenia, age 0-64
Affective disorder, age 0-64
Surgical D1020
F1510
G0440
H0320
I0320
I0620
I1630
J0210
K0510
L0710
L0810
Sinus & mastoid procedures
Diffuse cirsectomy
Subtotal extirpation
Laparoscopic cholecystectomy w/o C.D.E.
Knee joint replacement
Spondylosyndesis
Menisectomy
Mastectomy for malignancy
Major thyroid procedures
Urinary incontinence procedures
Major transurethral proceduresKim Y-K  •  Reimbursement System of Korean National Health Insurance 
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the recent Neo-DRG pilot project which ended in June 2010. 
However, the healthcare sector and academia continue to hold 
a negative view on Neo-DRG-based payment system, and vari-
ous stakeholders including the government, NHIC, HIRA, and 
hospitals are organizing their own task force and advisory units 
for continued discussion in-depth.
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION ON ALTERNATIVES
The attributes of the two reimbursement alternatives can be ex-
amined and cross-compared on two dimensions including the 
evaluation on performance of the reimbursement system and 
operation of the system. First, DRG-based payment as part of 
PPS is effective for healthcare cost control. Although certain 
motives exist for quality degradation, the quality is reported to 
be maintained to a certain degree in the aforementioned em-
pirical studies. In addition, the administrative efficiency of the 
system is low because its screening function must be reinforced. 
With regard to its operation, reimbursement schedule must be 
established since rate(s) per case is determined in advance by 
groups of diseases under the DRG-based system.
  On the contrary, global budget may be evaluated as adequate 
for controlling the cost of medical care and improving the qual-
ity of healthcare and administrative efficiency. In terms of op-
eration of the system, the total amount of medical cost is fixed 
in advance under the global budget system. Furthermore, the 
providers retain financial responsibilities since both of the pro-
viders and third party payers can confirm the total amount. As 
shown in the case of Taiwan, global budget is applicable across 
all types of healthcare institutions. The attributes discussed 
above are briefly summarized in Table 4.
  Furthermore, with regard to the global budget payment sys-
tem, the hospital industry in Korea believes that the current re-
imbursement system is not the sole factor of the recent increase 
in national health expenditure; rather, this rapid increase has 
resulted from an increase in societal needs for healthcare includ-
ing expanding national needs for overall health, development 
of medical technology, population aging, and expanding cover-
age of national health insurance (15). The majority of healthcare 
providers, hospitals in specific, are opposed to the claim that 
excess care arising from fee-for-service payment has led to the 
financial deterioration of national health insurance and that, as 
a direct consequence, healthcare institutions must take full re-
sponsibility with global budget payment as an appropriate solu-
tion. Therefore, the healthcare industry in Korea demands that, 
based on the experiences of major countries that have introduced 
global budget payment, countermeasures for the potential side 
effects such as ‘under-care’ of healthcare institutions, evading 
patients with severe diseases or conditions, distortion of medi-
cal practice, degradation of quality of care, and loss of motives 
for medical development must first be concretely established. 
In addition, now is the time to focus on further enhancing the 
quality of healthcare, and, in this respect, they argue that the 
fee-for-service payment system must be maintained until ap-
propriate care is delivered to the nation.
CONCLUSION
Subsequent to reviewing preceding studies and examining the 
status quo with regard to evolving healthcare reimbursement 
system in Korea, the researcher believes that applying a specific 
payment system uniformly across all types of healthcare insti-
tutions retains high risk. Rather, different payment systems can 
be applied to different types of institutions so that they may func-
tion as intended in accordance with unique attributes of each 
category. Clinic-level institutions mainly focus on treating sim-
ple diseases or conditions and managing chronic diseases (17), 
and thus we can consider applying ‘target health expenditure 
system’ to this category of healthcare institutions. On the other 
hand, hospitals in general focus on providing services to diseases 
that require hospitalization, and DRG-based payment system 
can be an appropriate alternative. In this case, the DRG-based 
system would be further divided into outpatient DRG system 
and inpatient DRG system. For the 44 advanced tertiary hospi-
tals operating across the nation, the researcher recommends 
global budget system in order to help alleviate the tilting phe-
nomenon toward large-sized healthcare institutions. This phe-
nomenon is especially predominant in Korea where patients 
with even minor diseases and conditions such as cold, sprain 
or otitis media tend to prefer receiving care from large hospitals 
rather than from local primary care institutions based on inap-
propriate patient mentality. In reality, these patients most likely 
do not require comprehensive medical specialties and high-end 
equipment that the large hospitals typically offer, and their dis-
torted preference has been identified to exacerbate the tilting 
phenomenon of the overall patient pool toward large-sized health-
Table 4. Comp arison among major reimbursement systems
Classification
Fee- 
for-service
DRG- 
based PPS
Global  
budget
Healthcare cost control Very poor Good Excellent
Quality of healthcare Variable, but good 
in general
Maintainable,  
but motives for 
degradation  
existent
Maintained
Administrative efficiency Very low Low High
Payment criterion Single treatment 
behavior or  
activity
Group of  
diseases or  
conditions
All services  
provided to  
policyholders  
in a given period
Technical requirement Establishing  
reimbursement 
schedule
Establishing  
reimbursement 
schedule
Establishing & 
negotiating costs 
by institution
Main agent responsible  
   for financial risks
Third party payer Provider & third 
party payer
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care institutions. With this taken into account, global budget 
system may be a helpful solution to the advanced tertiary hos-
pitals in Korea.
  In addition, the application of healthcare reimbursement 
system can be achieved step-by-step. One example is to apply 
the target health expenditure system to clinics and global bud-
get system to advanced tertiary hospitals first, then subsequent-
ly applying outpatient and inpatient DRG-based payment sys-
tems to the remaining categories of hospitals. Prior to introduc-
ing the DRG-based system, the target health expenditure sys-
tem may also be applied to general hospitals on a temporary 
basis. The target health expenditure system and global budget 
system can be introduced rather promptly under the given con-
ditions; however, DRG-based system is likely to consume more 
time for the actual adoption since it requires further research 
on bundling payment units and various other issues discussed 
in this study.
  Various alternatives under discussion for the prospective re-
imbursement system in Korea lack the possibility for social con-
sensus among the stakeholders with providers in particular. 
More importantly, issues regarding national health insurance 
encompass complex political factors that make this possibility 
even lower. The decision makers who experienced the physi-
cians’ strike during the initial stage of separation of prescribing 
and dispensing drugs have been reluctant to push ahead with a 
drastic reform. However, the issues of healthcare in Korea are 
becoming significant political agenda as witnessed in major 
developed countries, and the national healthcare expenditure 
is likely to rise consistently in the future. Is there room for change 
as far as the national health insurance reimbursement system 
in Korea is concerned? The researcher strongly believes so. How-
ever, developing public sphere among the stakeholders and 
striving for consensus shall be kept as collateral to attain the 
desirable system in reality.
Limitation
The researcher endeavored to anticipate and suggest the future 
reimbursement system of Korean National Health Insurance in 
this study by focusing on two of the most frequently discussed 
alternatives. However, the primary mechanism to achieve the 
goal of the study was to indirectly review closely the results of 
the preceding studies and tests with regard to these available 
alternatives. In order to deduce directly the appropriate reim-
bursement systems, which fit the attributes of Korean National 
Health Insurance, and suggest prospective direction, empirical 
analyses using up-to-date data shall further be conducted in 
the future.
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